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Introduction 
 
In his Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant considers that the assignment of the label 
“beautiful” to a certain object does not refer so much to the physical object itself, but to the 
way in which the representation of this object acts on the mood of the one who judges it, 
awakening in the individual a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.1 It is on the basis of what the 
subject feels that he or she could say whether what is being judged is beautiful or not. For 
Kant, beauty—whether of nature or of art—would have less to do with what the object is, and 
more with the way it affects us; for him, an aesthetic judgment on beauty is not a determining 
but a reflecting judgment. By giving up the notion of determining what the object-of-
judgment is, the subject, in an aesthetic judgment-of-taste, reflects purely and simply on what 
is intuited, disposing his or her cognitive faculties in a state of free play, in a lingering and 
calm contemplation, which ‘strengthens and reproduces itself’, and from which the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure derives (KU, 5: 222). A genuine aesthetic judgment on nature or art is 
not based on knowledge of what kind of flower it is, or what that painting objectively 
represents. Rather, the less we pay attention to those concepts, the purer the experience of 
beauty which nature or art gives us. 
In his essay Seeing the Invisible, Michel Henry, one of the major proponents of the so-called 
“theological turn” in contemporary French phenomenology,  praises Wassily Kandinsky, the 
Russian painter and art theorist, for his innovative formulation of abstract art—an art which 
seeks to turn the artist and the spectator radically inward.2 Henry argues that, after 
Kandinsky, art no longer seeks to represent the world and its objects, and thus ceases to focus 
on visibility and shifts its focus onto invisibility, or what Kandinsky calls the ‘inwardly’.3 
Henry’s claim is that the purpose of art becomes a way of allowing us to see what is not and 
cannot be seen. The means are only resources for this showing, used in order to give access to 
that which is invisible. Ultimately, his predominant aim is to take phenomenology into 
                                                          
1 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans by Paul Guyer (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). For quotations from Kant’s work, the English translation [of Immanuel 
Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften and Deutsche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902ff)] indicated here will be used. However, in order to facilitate 
the localisation of the passages within the Kant-Korpus, the in-text abbreviations indicated by the Kant-
Gesellschaft and the Akademieausgabe’s page numbering will be used as follows: KU, Akademieausgabe’s 
volume: page. The abbreviation KU corresponds to the Critique of Judgment, that is, Kritik der Urteilskraft. 
2 See Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible, trans. Scott Davidson (London: Continuum, 2009). 
3 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Point and Line on Plane’, in Complete Writings on Art, vol. I, ed. by Kenneth Clement 
Lindsay and Peter Vergo (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 547. 
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uncharted terrain, into the depths of pre-reflective, non-intentional self-experience. The 
world, for Henry, turns out to be empty of the real substance of Life.4 To find its essence, the 
self must dive completely inward, away from the exterior movements of intentionality and 
the world. For Henry, the real, the truth and the substance of Life, lies in non-intentional self-
experience. Life itself is, for Henry, understood as auto-affection, which means that affection 
is a self-relation completely immanent and radically independent and autonomous. 
This paper revolves around Kandinsky’s argument in favour of non-representational art, and 
aims to show to what extent it is possible to draw a connection between his art and theory 
through Kant’s notion of pure aesthetic judgments and Henry’s radical phenomenology. 
Thus, in this paper we will first present Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgments and Henry’s 
phenomenology of life, separately. Then, we will bring both theories in dialogue and in 
relation to Kandinsky’s abstractionism with the aim of highlighting and conserving the 
crucial inward turn in art. 
 
Kant: Art as Nature 
It is not fortuitous that, in his Critique of Judgment, Kant dwells more on beauty in nature 
than on beauty in art. This is because only the former could be the object of an authentic, pure 
aesthetic judgment-of-taste: a judgment in which the judge does not take into account any 
interest in the object-of-judgment—whether it be an interest of reason or of the senses—nor 
intends to assign a concept to it. 
To say, on the one hand, that a pure aesthetic judgment-of-taste does not take into account an 
interest of reason or senses means that when an object is judged aesthetically, this judgment 
considers neither a moral criterion nor the (mere) pleasantness of the sensations, which is 
idiosyncratic and therefore valid only to the one who judges. Therefore, at least in theory, 
“beautiful” could be used for both something morally reprehensible and something that does 
not concern the personal preferences of those who judge.5 
To say, on the other hand, that in these judgments one does not intend to attribute a concept 
to the judged object implies that the object is not considered from an epistemological point of 
view. Under these circumstances, a flower could be considered “beautiful” without regard to 
whether it is a daisy, a rose, a sunflower, or any other species of flower; rather, it is so judged 
simply on the basis of what is sensibly intuited and whose representation awakens in the 
judge a feeling of pleasure: an aesthetic pleasure. Nature would then be, for Kant, the object 
                                                          
4 Henry proposes a phenomenology of Life in stark contrast to a phenomenology of being-in-the-world; a life 
which is felt, as absolutely invisible, understood as an a priori condition for all conscious experience. 
5 “In theory” because, on the one hand, in the Analytic of the Beautiful [§§ 1-22] of the Critique of Judgment, 
Kant claims that judgments-of-taste on beauty have to do neither with moral judgments nor with judges’ 
interests; on the other hand, both in the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments and the Dialectic of the 
Aesthetic Power of Judgment, he talks, at least indirectly, not only of empirical and intellectual interests in the 
beautiful [§§ 41 and 42], but also of ‘beauty as a symbol of morality’ [§ 59]. For now, attention will be paid to 
the first part: not only because it is there that Kant points out what makes a judgment-of-taste on beauty an 
aesthetic judgment, but also, and especially, because the core of the Analytic of the Beautiful [§ 9] encloses, 
according to him, ‘the key to the critique of taste, and [is] hence worthy of full attention’ (KU, 5: 216). 
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par excellence of pure aesthetic judgments-of-taste because its beauty is ‘self-subsisting’ 
(KU, 5: 229). According to him: 
in order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we […] relate the 
representation [i.e., what is being judged] to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure […], by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in 
which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation (KU, 5: 203-04). 
Thus, the self-subsistence of the beauty of nature would concern the fact that a judgment-of-
taste on it ‘is merely contemplative’ and only takes into account the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure that awakens in the subject. However, Kant goes on to argue that ‘this 
contemplation itself is also not directed to concepts; for the judgment-of taste is not a 
cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a practical one), and hence it is neither grounded 
on concepts nor aimed at them’ (KU, 5: 209). And that, ultimately, would make the ‘taste for 
the beautiful [...] a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, neither that of the senses 
nor that of reason, extorts approval’ (KU, 5: 210). 
In fact, Kant considers that it is nature—not art—which is proper to pure aesthetic 
judgments-of-taste because its beauty is free (pulchritudo vaga); that is, it ‘presupposes no 
concept of what the object ought to be’ (KU, 5: 229). Rather, in a judgment-of-taste, nature 
and its objects are judged only in terms of what their representation arouses in the mood of 
the one who judges them. This means that the purity, or aesthteticity, of such judgments 
concerns the fact that, in them, one does bears in mind neither something that involves a 
conceptual (re)cognition of the object-of-judgment nor its mere sensory charm; rather, those 
are judgments in which we pay attention to what happens to our state of mind/mood 
[Gemützustand], that is, to the way in which the object-of-judgment vivifies our mood, 
arising from this vivification a feeling of pleasure. Therefore, ‘flowers are free natural 
beauties’, since: 
[h]ardly anyone other than the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed 
to be; and even the botanist, who recognizes in it the reproductive organ of the plant, 
pays no attention to this natural end if he judges the flower by means of taste (KU, 5: 
229). 
Now, the reason why Kant claims that art cannot be the object of a pure aesthetic judgment-
of-taste concerns the fact that ‘art is distinguished from nature as doing (facere) is from 
acting or producing in general (agere), and the product or consequence of the former is 
distinguished as a work (opus) from the latter as an effect (effectus)’. Thus, according to him, 
‘if something is called a work of art without qualification, in order to distinguish it from an 
effect of nature, then by that is always understood a work of human beings’, that is, with a 
‘cause that produced it’ and that ‘conceived of an end, which [it] has to thank for its form’ 
(KU, 5: 303). 
It is to the artist that art owes its form, since the former intentionally organises the raw 
material in order to produce a work of art. Nonetheless, whether, in its background, ‘art 
always has a determinate intention of producing something’, that is, an intention ‘aimed at the 
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production of a determinate object, then [...] the object would please only through concepts’ 
and, in this case, ‘the art would not please in the mere judging, i.e., it would not please as 
beautiful but as mechanical art’ (KU, 5: 306). 
To say that an art pleases as something ‘mechanical’ means to say that it pleases to the extent 
that the artist ‘performs the actions requisite’ to carry out their intentions (KU, 5: 305). Thus, 
since we identify and recognise this concept, that is, the intention of the artist materialised in 
the work of art, the work pleases us. 
Now, if Kant considers that ‘the judgment-of-taste is [...] not a cognitive judgment, hence not 
a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground 
cannot be other than subjective’, to identify something as ‘beautiful’ has nothing to do with 
recognising the artist’s intentions and what they objectively meant objectively with the work 
(KU, 5: 203). Instead, it concerns the way that this representation refers to the subject who 
judges it, that is, how it affects his or her mood, awakening in the individual a feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure ‘that contributes nothing to cognition but only holds the given 
representation in the subject up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the mind 
becomes conscious in the feeling of its state’ (KU, 5: 204). And it is nothing but this that 
Kant intends with his claim that ‘beautiful art is an art to the extent that it seems at the same 
time to be nature’ (KU, 5: 306). 
That beautiful art should appear to be nature does not mean that art should be limited to the 
reproduction of nature in its forms; rather, although Kant states that ‘in a product of art one 
must be aware that it is art, and not nature’, whether it is meant to be ‘beautiful art’, it ‘must 
still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of 
nature’, that is, free from any recognisable intentionality, such as a free natural beauty 
(pulchritudo vaga) (KU, 5: 306).  
As a matter of fact, since pure aesthetic judgments-of-taste do not rest on concepts, Kant 
states that ‘if one judges objects merely in accordance with concepts, then all representation 
of beauty is lost’, so that ‘there can also be no rule in accordance with which someone could 
be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful’ (KU, 5: 215). Therefore, he goes on, in 
a judgment-of-taste on beauty—above all, on beauty of nature—‘the powers of cognition that 
are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate concept 
restricts them to a particular rule of cognition’ (KU, 5: 217). 
That being the case, if it is with nature and not with art that one could carry out genuine 
aesthetic judgments-of-taste—and, nevertheless, art is beautiful insofar as it resembles 
nature—this means nothing other than that art should provoke (or seek to provoke) that 
peculiar harmonious relation of the cognitive faculties, which Kant calls free play and from 
which comes the feeling of aesthetic pleasure. And this, ultimately, would be achieved to the 
extent that the artist does not let transpire their intentions, that is, to the extent that we do not 
recognise ‘any sign that the rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist’ (KU, 5: 307).  
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Thus, for Kant, judgments on beauty would concern neither the recognition of the object-of-
judgment nor what it represents; rather, they would have to do with how this object-of-
judgment reverberates within the one who judges it. 
 
Henry: Art as Life 
It becomes clear, from a Kantian perspective, that when we look at a work of art we do not 
choose to see its materiality—the cracks of the canvas, the splits in the wood, or the patches 
of colour spread across the painted surface. Instead, we choose to perceive what is being 
represented. The means of painting are thus resources used to show something.  
Phenomenology, from its inception, has been concerned with the first person lived experience 
in contact with a world, imbued with meaning, which shows itself. Alongside other 
contemporary phenomenologists, Henry’s work can be understood as a form of “new 
phenomenology” because of its interest in extreme, excessive, or invisible phenomena that 
show themselves at the very limit of our experience.6 When reading Henry, it becomes 
immediately clear that throughout his works lies a consistent mission: to disentangle 
interiority from exteriority in an absolutist way. For him these poles are two radically 
different modes of manifestation which should not intersect, and he denotes the former as the 
invisible and the latter as the visible, or, respectively, the ‘Truth of Life’ and the ‘Truth of the 
World’. The visible world, for Henry, turns out to be empty of the real substance of Life, and, 
to find its essence, he maintains that we must dive completely inward, away from the exterior 
movements of our intentional relation with the world. Henry’s predominant aim is to 
ultimately explore the depths of pre-reflective, non-intentional self-experience by challenging 
phenomenology as it is traditionally conceived, redefining its boundaries, limits, and 
possibilities.   
Henry argues that exteriority harbours within it the possibility of deception. He believes that 
this can be clearly shown in language, including representational art, since it is always 
referring to something external. The separation in language between “what is said” and “what 
is meant”, for Henry, allows falsity and deception to interfere. In one of his works, I am the 
Truth, Henry argues that it is not the text which has the power to give us access to the Truth 
of which it speaks of; rather, it is ‘Truth and Truth alone that can offer us access to itself’.7 
For Henry, the notion that language is a means of communicating the Truth is an illusion 
since the single Truth is a Truth independently of and prior to language. In his last work, 
Words of Christ, Henry explores the possibility of a language in which this distance would 
not exist, and that would therefore exclude the possibility of lying and deception.8 This would 
                                                          
6 One of the central themes which stand out in contemporary phenomenology is how it takes as it very starting 
position the critical stance of questioning the limits and possibility of phenomenology itself. This can be found 
in works of prominent phenomenologists, such as Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Louis Chrétien. 
7 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. by Susan Emanuel (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 9.  
8 See Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. by C.M. Gschwandtner (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub, 
2012). 
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have to be a word of Truth—a word of Life—which is radically different from the word of 
the World.9 Thus, for Henry, the true meaning of Life is wholly separate from the truth of the 
world, which merely simulates it but does not give genuine access to it.  
By employing this sharp dichotomy of World and Life, Henry maintains that Truth is not 
found in the World but within Life, whereby this Truth does not point to anything exterior to 
itself since it is non-intentional Life itself. Henry’s claim is that truth is accessed through its 
irreducibility to thought, and one does not know it through the effect of some knowledge or 
learning against the background of the truth of the world; rather, we know it, and can only 
know it, within and through Life itself, and hence through absolute interiority. 
Henry’s philosophy of art follows this same train of thought, and hence the division between 
World and Life. This dichotomy divorces the inner sense from the outer sense, whereby the 
immanent self has unlimited affect at its disposition without the need to intuit any external 
reality. Thus, the independent, self-sufficient artist, or viewer, does not need to encounter 
exteriority at all, and, according to Henry, it is abstract art which manages to capture this 
absolute interiority—that which is void of any exteriority, whereby the visible, natural world 
is abandoned completely. Abstract art is, for Henry, equivalent to invisible interiority, 
whereby meaningful experience here is not dependent on any exterior influence outside the 
subject but, rather, on the subject’s unique interior realm.   
Abstract art no longer seeks to represent the world and its objects, and thus ceases to focus on 
the visible. Rather, it shifts its focus on the invisible and the internal. Henry’s claim is that the 
purpose of art becomes a means to give access to that which is invisible. In relation to this 
inward turn in abstract art, Henry asks the following questions: ‘Does our world—the world 
of European nihilism in which all values are undone and self-destruct—provide the most 
appropriate site for disclosing the source of all values, especially aesthetic values?’, and 
‘should we afﬁrm that, in spite of its revolutionary character, abstract painting leads us back 
to the source of all paintings, and moreover, that it alone discloses the possibility of painting 
and allows us to understand it?’10 
In Barbarism, Henry maintains that ‘art is an activity of sensibility, the fulfilment of its 
powers, whereas modern science, with the elimination of sensible qualities from nature, 
defines its own field and defines itself through the exclusion of this sensibility’. 11 He actually 
defines scientism as an act of barbarity, which he takes up from, and further radicalises, 
Husserl’s critique of the Galilean paradigm in the latter’s last work entitled The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Henry uses such harsh labels in that 
he argues that modern science negates and denies the being and development of the true 
meaning of Life. Barbarism, for Henry, appears precisely as a consequence of the attempt to 
negate subjectivity and to reduce it to the sphere of visibility by objectifying and quantifying 
it. Reducing life to the objectifiable and the quantifiable is precisely a negation of life as 
invisible affectivity.  
                                                          
9 Henry uses Truth and Life interchangeably.  
10 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, pp. 2, 3. 
11 Michel Henry, Barbarism, trans. Scott Davidson, (London: Continuum, 2012), p. 23. 
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Moreover, according to Henry, the scientific domain does not overlap—not even partially—
with the domain of art. Aesthetic value does not lie in the former but wholly in the latter, 
whereby ‘the laws that make these scientific documents beautiful are the aesthetic laws of 
sensibility; they are not the mathematical or physical laws that the scientist seeks to decipher 
in them’.12 The artwork is thus, for Henry, radically distinct from its materiality; as the 
canvas, the copper, or wood belong to the exterior world of objects which is a reality of a 
different order. The moment aesthetic seeing takes place, the materials withdraw for the 
artwork to reveal itself. The artwork is, then, no longer an object of the world but an entity 
whose purpose is to show the reality represented in the artwork itself.  
For Henry, the work of art belongs outside of the real world and, hence, to a dimension of 
‘irreality’.13 Thus, the authenticity of a work of art cannot in any way overlap with the 
authenticity of its material components. This irreality of the work of art is not only 
understood as in direct contrast to the real world but, moreover, must be thought of in 
connection to the essence of life. Henry claims that: 
If the work of art is never in this world, if it is not truly situated where its support is—
right there on this wall in front of us, in this context—it is not that it is foreign to 
sensibility, but instead that its essence is located in sensibility and that its being 
unfolds where sensibility unfolds, in life, in the radical immanence of absolute 
subjectivity.14 
Henry claims that the artwork is outside of the world, detached from anything that belongs to 
exteriority. It belongs to a realm which allows us to feel, a place in which both the artwork 
and our true selves stand. Art is thus, for Henry, a representation of life which does not show 
its reality in the world but, instead, is represented in the form of an irreal representation. This 
is why, for Henry, art needs imagination—the faculty to represent something in its absence. 
Art denies the world as it cannot live in the world but only beyond it, and that is why works 
of art present themselves to us as an enigma. In Seeing the Invisible, Henry puts forth these 
two ideas:  
1. The content of painting, of all paintings, is the Internal, the invisible life that does 
not cease to be invisible and remains forever in the Dark, and  
2. The means by which it expresses this invisible content—forms and colours—are 
themselves invisible, in their original reality and true sense, at any rate.15 
Henry’s claim is that the purpose of art becomes a way that allows us to see what is not 
cannot be seen. He argues that when art tries to imitate the visible world, it becomes 
subordinated to a pre-established model of which it cannot be anything but a mere replica. 
Explicitly, Henry draws influence from the Platonic idea of art as mimesis, whereby that 
which is shown in the light of the world is always already given in this way—the artist only 
                                                          
12 Henry, Barbarism, p. 24. 
13 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 12. 
14 Henry, Barbarism, p. 35. 
15 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 10. 
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has to copy it. Thus, the value of the work of art becomes tuned to the value of the greater or 
lesser commitment and reliability to the model being copied (and hence to the visible/ 
exterior). The only way out, according to Henry, is for art to cease being interested in the 
visible and focus solely on the invisible—and, hence, the interior. Hence, his formulation: 
‘Interior = interiority = invisible = life = pathos = abstract’.16 
 
Kant and Henry: Kandinsky and Abstract Art 
Even though one cannot simply overlook the important differences and originality of their 
work, both Kant’s and Henry’s theories on art seem to highlight and endorse a necessary shift 
from the world of representation (the exterior world) towards the world of subjectivity (the 
interior world). As already noted, Kant claims that the beauty of art is not (or at least should 
not be) judged in terms of what art represents, but, rather, in terms of the feeling of pleasure it 
arouses—meaning that it is not a question of recognising what a work of art portrays, but, 
instead, how it reverberates in our state of mind. As for Henry, the ‘Truth of Life’ (the 
invisible/interior) and the ‘Truth of the World’ (the visible/exterior) are two radically 
different modes of manifestation which must remain separate. The visible world, for Henry, 
turns out to be empty of the real substance of Life, and, to find its essence, he maintains that 
one must dive completely inward, away from the exterior movements of our intentional 
relation with the world. Both of these thinkers’ ideas on art could be further understood in 
light of Kandinsky’s Abstractionism. 
It is in the figure of Kandinsky that Western Abstractionism has its pioneer and one of its 
main heralds. Not only is the first abstract work of Western art history attributed to this 
Russian painter but, moreover, in his work On the Spiritual in Art, published in 1911, 
Kandinsky provides a theoretical basis for this new visual language.17   
The early draft version of this book18 states that ‘nature’s language remains her own’, so that 
‘if music wishes to express exactly what nature expresses to man in her own tongue, then it 
takes merely the inner value of nature’s speech and repeats this inward reality in the external 
forms peculiar to music, i.e., musical speech’.19 To say that nature expresses itself in its own 
language denotes that nature affects us in a way that is absolutely particular, and, although 
Kandinsky asserts that ‘this language cannot be imitated’, he believes that ‘this sort of 
mood’—that is, this reverberation of nature’s language in us—could be ‘created by every art, 
not by the external imitation of nature, but by the artistic re-creation of this mood in its inner 
value’ (OSA, 155).20 
                                                          
16 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 11. 
17 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘On the Spiritual in Art’, in Complete Writings on Art, vol. I, pp. 114-219. Henceforth 
cited in text and footnotes as (OSA, page number).  
18 Which was read aloud at the Pan-Russian Congress of Artists, in December 1911, by Nikolai Kublin. See the 
editors’ introductory commentary in (OSA, 115). 
19 Wassily Kandinsky, Complete Writings on Art, vol. II, ed. by Kenneth Clement Lindsay and Peter Vergo 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1970), pp. 876-77, endnote 39. 
20 Unnumbered footnote. 
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Kandinsky claims that ‘every object is a being with its own life and, inevitably, with its own 
effect flowing from it’, so that we are ‘constantly subject to this psychological effect’ (OSA, 
168). Now, to say that we are steadily under the influence of what surrounds us is to say, 
metaphorically, that ‘the ever-changing external environment of man [...] continually sets the 
strings of the piano (the soul) in vibration, by means of the keys (objects)’ (OSA, 169). And 
this would apply not only to objects of nature, but also to objects created by human hands—
above all, works of art. 
Among all the artistic languages, Kandinsky takes music as the ideal exemplary because it 
‘externally is completely emancipated from nature’ and ‘does not need to borrow external 
forms from anywhere in order to create its language’. In contrast to other art, music seems to 
affect us by itself, as music, because ‘with few exceptions, and deviations, [it] has for several 
centuries been the art that uses its resources not to represent natural appearances, but […] to 
create a unique life of musical tones’ (OSA, 154). 
And it is precisely because of this that Kandinsky calls music ‘the most immaterial of the 
arts’ of his time: because its ability to affect us does not depend on the content it represents 
(OSA, 154). Indeed, it is not for the plot that a Passion of Bach touches us, for it may be the 
case for someone to hear it, to feel its soul vibrate, without knowing that it refers to some 
Gospel. In short, it is only (or at least, mainly) by its own tools (i.e., notes, pauses, sounds 
and silences) that music reverberates directly across the enjoyer’s soul, without resorting to a 
cognitive recognition of what it could or should mean. 
Now, if, on the one hand, Kandinsky claims that every art should seek to follow ‘the path of 
saying what they are best able to say, through means that are peculiar to each’, he argues on 
the other hand that the different arts could compare their means (OSA, 153). However, when 
comparing their resources with each other, an art could only learn from the other successfully 
‘if not only the external but also the principles are learned’. He explains: ‘one art has to learn 
from the other how it tackles its own materials and, having learned this, use in principle the 
materials peculiar to itself in a similar way, i.e., according to the principle that it belongs to 
itself alone’; in this case, ‘the richest lessons are to be learned from music’ (OSA, 154). 
Indeed, just as music through mere sound ‘has direct access to the soul [and] finds there an 
echo’—because humanity ‘hath music’ in itself —painting, ‘with the help of the means at its 
disposal’, could ‘become an art in the abstract sense, and eventually achieve purely pictorial 
composition’ (OSA, 161-62). 
Kandinsky’s desire for painting to become abstract reflects his conviction that the successful 
imitation of nature’s phenomena cannot be the purpose of art. Now, if the purpose of art is, 
according to him, the refinement of the human soul,21 and this refinement is achieved by the 
vibration of the latter,22 painting, as an art that serves its purposes, should focus on the 
triggering of this vibration, not on a representation of nature. Arguing, therefore, in favour of 
an autonomy of painting, Kandinsky considers that the painting moves toward this 
independence to the extent that it ‘examine[s] its forces and its materials’, ‘become[s] 
                                                          
21 See (OSA, 212). 
22 See (OSA, 219). 
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acquainted with them, as the music has long since done’, and ‘attempt[s] to use these 
materials and forces in a purely painterly way for the purpose of creation’ (OSA, 155). 
Kandinsky’s preference for the abstract lies in the fact that, according to him, ‘purely abstract 
entities [...] have their own existence, their own influence, and their own effect’, which are 
inherent to form itself and do not depend on what it represents (OSA, 165). However, on the 
one hand, if he is aware that the artists of his time ‘cannot manage exclusively with pure 
abstract forms’—since they are ‘too imprecise for him [or her]’ and could apparently 
‘impoverish one’s means of expression’—it is, on the other hand, to the extent that 
composition does not depend on superfluous elements, operating ‘by purely abstract forms, or 
by corporeal forms that have been completely abstracted’, that it manages to potentiate its 
vibrant effect on the human soul, since it thus focuses not on what is external, but internal to 
composition itself, that is, to its internal necessity (OSA, 166, 169). 
Now, it is, according to Kandinsky, this ‘double interiority’ that art must have before its eyes: 
(a) the compositional interiority of the work, that is, the organisation of its forms in a more 
abstract way, and not to the detriment of the representation of something; and (b) the reader’s 
inner sense, the reverberation of their soul and not the mere pleasure of sight. 
Kandinsky, in fact, believes that painting has what one might call two levels of contact with 
the viewer: a retinal level and a spiritual level. The former would be the level of the physical 
effect of colour. He says that ‘the eye itself is charmed by the beauty and other qualities of 
the colour’, so that ‘the spectator experiences a feeling of satisfaction, of pleasure, like a 
gourmet who has tasty morsel in his mouth’. This physical satisfaction, however, ‘can only 
be of short duration [...], superficial, leaving behind no lasting impression if the soul remains 
closed’. Nonetheless, he goes on, it ‘can also be developed into a [deeper] form of 
experience’ (OSA, 156-57). And this is where the second level of the colour effect comes in: 
the psychological, spiritual one. 
It is at this level that art fulfils its real function, ‘calling forth a vibration from the soul’ (OSA, 
157). For if, as argued above, the purpose of art is to make the human soul vibrate, then the 
pictorial composition, the harmony of colours, could ‘only be based upon the principle of 
purposefully touching’ it (OSA, 160). Indeed, in one of the most poetic passages of On the 
Spiritual in Art, Kandinsky claims: 
Colour is a means of exerting a direct influence upon the soul. Colour is the keyboard. 
The eye is the hammer. The soul is the piano, with its many strings. The artist is the 
hand that purposefully sets the soul vibrating by means of this or that key (OSA, 160). 
He calls this ‘principle of purposefully touching the human soul’ a ‘principle of internal 
necessity’ (OSA, 160)—and if ‘whatever arises from internal, spiritual necessity is beautiful’ 
so that ‘beautiful is that which is inwardly beautiful’, then ‘beauty’ concerns that which 
‘refines and enriches the soul’, making it vibrate (OSA, 214).  
One could ask how close Kandinsky and Kant are to each other, and of course, some 
differences cannot be disregarded. The first—and most obvious—is the fact that they are 
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separated from each other by more than a century: Kant writes from the twilight of the 
Enlightenment; Kandinsky, from the awakening of modern avant-garde. Furthermore, their 
approaches entail different perspectives: Kant speaks of a reception theory whilst Kandinsky, 
in turn, speaks of the works of art themselves and how they could reach the soul of the viewer 
in a more affective way. Besides that, it is the beauty of nature which is Kant’s subject of 
great interest, as he does not see a passage from the agreeableness of the senses to the 
pleasure with the beautiful. Kandinsky’s analysis, in turn, is not only about art (and, as he 
himself asserts, about ‘painting, in particular’), but he also sees physical satisfaction in colour 
as a possible trigger which can reverberate in the soul of the viewer (OSA, 121).  
Still, it seems valid to draw attention to the fact that, for Kant, a judgment about the beauty of 
a thing does not rest on certain concepts or moral values, but, rather, on the way this thing 
affects the subject’s mood, arousing in the subject a feeling of pleasure. Similarly, for 
Kandinsky, ‘a “well-painted” picture is in reality not one that is correct in values (the 
inevitable valeurs of the French) or divided up almost scientifically into cold and warm, but 
rather one that leads a full inner life’, and that, by these means, can produce a ‘spiritual 
vibration within the soul’ of its viewer (OSA, 211). 
In the light of this, Kandinsky’s Abstractionism seems to update, one could say, some aspects 
of what Kant intended with his theory of pure aesthetic judgments of taste (although, for the 
latter, the art of his time would be incapable of being object of such judgments)—especially 
in terms of how what is at stake in judgments-of-taste is not the content of the judged object, 
but the way it inwardly affects the subject—his or her mood, soul, or state of mind.23 
On the other hand, unlike Kant, Henry lived to witness abstract art becoming a prevalent 
visual language of his time. Henry praises Kandinsky for his ground-breaking formulation of 
abstract art, an art which seeks to turn the artist and the spectator radically inward. According 
to Henry, Kandinsky’s abstract paintings manage to disclose the Truth through their 
complete, radical emphasis on the invisible world (interiority) by in turn rejecting and 
annihilating all traces of the visible world (exteriority). Abstract art, for Henry, becomes the 
ideal means to elevate the status of an interiority void from any form of exteriority—
understood as radical immanence.  
Henry maintains that after Kandinsky art no longer seeks to represent the world. Rather, it 
shifts its focus completely on the invisible; and, hence, the interior. In Seeing the Invisible, 
Henry states: 
This is the miracle of abstract painting: it constructs the unlimited monumentality of a 
work that no longer has a foothold in the visible world, that ignores its rules and does 
not seek anything from it, neither aid nor sanction, and that emerges with the pure 
force and inﬁnite certainty of life.24 
                                                          
23 For another approach between Kant and Kandinsky, focusing on sublimity and abstraction in modern art, see 
Marina Silenzi, ‘El juicio estético sobre lo bello: Lo sublime en el arte y el pensamiento de Kandinsky’, 
Andamios, 11 (2009), 287-302. 
24 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 107. 
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Henry praises the imagination as an immanent experience, the immediacy of which is never 
broken or separate. Imagination, for him, entails positing something ‘other than what is and 
what is there right in front of us—something other than the world. To imagine is to posit life. 
The imagination belongs to life; it develops there entirely and does not leave it’.25 For Henry, 
art’s creative imagination does not give us smokescreens or tricks to contemplate, like the 
depth of a third dimensional vase or a tree where there is only a ﬂat surface. Art thus ceases 
to be the faculty of representing a thing in its absence; instead, it becomes the magical power 
of making something real. 
 
Conclusion 
Although operating within different contexts and with different motivations, we tried to show 
that the theories of Kant, Kandinsky, and Henry on art have, at least, one dominant and 
mutual concern, namely: an inward turn, which can be captured through abstract art (or 
better, the experience of it) as it points towards the inner dimension of the subject. For Kant, 
this is in line with what is referred to as his “Copernican turn” in philosophy, whereby the 
subject is positioned in the centre of his epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. For Kandinsky, 
this turn concerns his idea that art must be guided by a ‘principle of internal necessity’.  
Some aspects of Kandinsky’s Abstractionism could bring us closer to Kant's aesthetics, since 
the former’s theory, even without the Kantian transcendental argumentation, can serve as an 
empirical example to help us understand and visualise what the latter intends with his theory 
of pure judgments-of-taste. On the other hand, with his aesthetic theory turned to the way 
objects affect our state-of-mind, Kant could serve as an aid to better understand not only the 
breakdown of figuration proposed by Abstractionism, but also the very negation of art and 
classical beauty, as exemplified by, for instance, Duchamp’s Fountain.  
Furthermore, it was shown that, for Henry and Kandinsky, the essence of human beings and 
art is not found in exteriority/visibility, but in a radical and absolute interiority/invisibility. 
The proper name of this invisibility, for Henry, is ‘Life’; a life which is lived and felt and yet 
remains invisible in an absolutist sense. For him all experiences are of this kind, whereby this 
feeling, or pathos, is wholly contrasted with visibility. Still, a radical shift towards interiority 
should not be understood as a complete denial and annihilation of the external world. In this 
sense, we can still maintain that the one doing the “turning” remains rooted in the world of 
ordinary humanity.  Therefore, an inward turn in art can be understood as a means to capture 
and further enhance the essence of human life by positioning the world of affect and 
subjectivity at its centre. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, p. 108. 
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